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Abstract
At the 2000 World Radio Conference (WRC), a European initiative resulted in the
approval of resolutions 605 and 606 (agenda item 1.15), which the United States
opposed. These resolutions established provisional power flux density (PFD) limits on
the L2 and L5 frequencies of the Global Positioning System. These limits will negatively
affect the $1.2B GPS modernization.
The United States will have to present its positions and rationale regarding the
PFD limits to international meetings, including the 2003 World Radio Conference, to
persuade the international community to adopt the U.S. view. Developing the U.S. view
and conducting the supporting technical work for the World Radio Conference is
accomplished through a domestic interagency U.S. process called the International
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (ITAC) process. In this process, the interests
and efforts of numerous agencies must be coordinated to produce a focused and cohesive
argument. Accomplishing this is not easy. In fact, several players in the ITAC process
working issues surrounding WRC resolutions 605 and 606 have encountered considerable
difficulty reaching agreement and submitting technical contributions internationally.
An analysis of the ITAC process using coordination theory reveals that the
problem stems from coequal participants attempting to coordinate directly conflicting
interests in a consensus-based process. The problem is further complicated by the
geographic separation of the parties. Several remedial actions are available, including
using a third-party to arbitrate directly conflicting issues and co-locating the parties.
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SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: A
CASE STUDY IN INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

I.

Introduction

Background
At the 2000 World Radio Conference (WRC), a European initiative resulted in the
approval of resolutions 605 and 606 (agenda item 1.15), which the United States opposed
(Schoettler, 2000: 48, 49). These resolutions established the need to consider power flux
density (PFD) limits on the L2 and L5 frequencies of the Global Positioning System
(Delegation Report, 2000: 48, 50), as well as future Radio Navigation Satellite Systems
(RNSS). GPS satellites transmit navigation data to the GPS receivers on the L2 and L5
bands. The resolutions passed at WRC-2000 place provisional limits on the power of the
satellite transmissions. The limits are based upon the theory that GPS Satellite
transmissions can interfere with Radars and Distance Measuring Equipments (DME's),
which have been allocated in the L2 and L5 bands prior to radio navigation satellite
systems (RNSS).
These limits will directly affect the $1.2B GPS modernization and are undesirable
to the United States for several reasons. U.S. forces depend upon GPS technology, and
the successful jamming of current and weaker GPS signals would be harmful to U.S.
operations, and could place U.S. troops at risk. The PFD limits restrict the power of GPS
signals, and therefore increase the system's susceptibility to jamming and inadvertent
interference. Once international rules on power restrictions become permanent, changes

to these rules will require international agreement. If the restrictions could not be lifted,
the system's development would be constrained.
The Global Positioning System Joint Program office has taken action to protect
the GPS spectrum. These actions, including conducting technical studies, simulations,
and tests, provide the technical and engineering arguments that ensure unnecessary
restrictions are not imposed (Department of the Air Force WRC-03 Plan). The U.S.
position for Resolution 605 is a coordination method whereby the RNSS operators will
coordinate to provide protection to incumbent systems and retain the flexibility to
modernize and build future RNSS systems. The U.S. position for Resolution 606 is that
no PFD limit is needed (U.S. Preliminary View). The results of the technical studies and
tests are presented internationally in ITU forums and other venues to support the U.S.
position. In order to submit papers internationally, they must be domestically
coordinated and approved through an interagency government process.
"The activities of the ITU [(International Telecommunications Union)], including
the [World Radio Conferences], offer the United States an important opportunity to
advance its views on technical standards and regulations" (U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, 1991: 14). It is at these ITU meetings and the World Radio
Conference that the United States will have to present its arguments and persuade the
international community to adopt the U.S. view.
Developing the U.S. view and supporting technical work is accomplished through
a domestic interagency U.S. process called the International Telecommunications
Advisory Committee (ITAC) process. The interests and efforts of numerous agencies

must be coordinated to produce a focused and cohesive argument. Accomplishing this is
not easy.
Establishing and maintaining a successful interagency coordination program is
extremely difficult (Rogers, 1982: 5). Individuals attempting to orchestrate interorganizational coordination face problems ranging from communication to fragmentation
of authority (Rogers, 1982: 66). The ITAC process and preparations for the 2003 World
Radio Conference is no different. Producing a focused and cohesive supported position
on GPS from the diverse interests in the United States has been and continues to be
challenging.
Problem Statement
The Global Positioning System Joint Program Office has been having difficulty
gaining domestic approval to submit the results of technical analyses performed related to
WRC resolutions 605 and 606 internationally. This difficulty stems from the apparent
divergent perspectives and interests within the U.S. government interacting within the
International Telecommunication Advisory Committee Process (ITAC).
This technical, bureaucratic, and political conflict risks delaying or weakening
defense of U.S. spectrum in the international arena. Bureaucratic conflict in which the
solution is the product of an interagency power struggle and not based solely on the
overriding national interest can cause significant harm to U.S. interests in the Global
Positioning System Program. The U.S. government must act with a consistent voice to
protect its interests abroad, and in doing so form and support its positions with a unified
objective in mind.

Research Question
This study examined the domestic spectrum management process surrounding
World Radio Conference resolutions 605 and 606. This study analyzed the International
Telecommunication Advisory Process, with an emphasis on the approval process for
technical contributions. This study identified problem areas, and recommended
alternatives to improve the process. Improving this domestic process will help the U.S.
more effectively defend its interests internationally.
Methodology
The methodology was a single-case study design (Yin, 1984) analyzing GPS
spectrum management pertaining to WRC resolutions 605 and 606 issues. The spectrum
management process involves many agencies and organizations throughout the U.S.
government. This process provides an opportunity to assess a specific example of
interagency coordination, and help the Global Positioning System Program in the
process. The process will be analyzed using coordination theory.
Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized in five chapters. Each chapter covers a different focus on
the topic. Readers only interested in the analysis and results should focus on chapters
four and five. The theory and method are described in chapters two and three.

II.

Literature Review

Coordination Theory
Coordination theory provides a framework for analyzing the management of
interdependencies between organizations. Coordination theory is a basis upon which
coordination failures can be identified and alternative approaches generated. In this
instance, coordination theory will be used to analyze how the GPS Joint Program Office
(JPO), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and other Federal Government
agencies coordinate WRC 605 and 606 issues in the International Telecommunication
Advisory Committee Process (ITAC). This chapter will formally define coordination,
provide a methodology for assessing coordination failures, coordinating mechanisms,
task dependencies, and identify alternative coordination mechanisms to produce a more
effective system in coordinating U.S. government actions in the international
telecommunications arena.
Coordination Defined
According to Crowston, "[in] coordination theory, actors in organizations face
coordination problems that arise from dependencies that constrain how tasks can be
performed" (Crowston, 1997: 159). The interests and positions of the various U.S.
government agencies create dependencies between actions taken by various agencies in
the formation of U.S. spectrum positions. The agency representatives must coordinate
the positions across the many agencies with the goal of protecting U.S. interests as
effectively as possible.

Several types of dependencies occur in spectrum management. One dependency
that frequently occurs in spectrum management is a task-resource dependency, which is
based on the shared use, by two or more agencies of the same bandwidth. In this
example, the task is whatever the frequency is desired for, such as communicating, and
the resource is the free bandwidth. One agency's actions in the bandwidth may constrain
the other agency's ability to use the bandwidth by causing interference, and as a result the
use must be coordinated. Continuing from this fundamental example, U.S. positions and
technical contributions submitted abroad can have impact on international regulations
that affect the use of spectrum, such as defining what constitutes "interference". As a
result of this influence on international regulations, dependencies arise from these
internationally submitted documents—a shared output dependency (listed under "tasktask" in table 1). This means that a document or position that one agency desires to
submit internationally is constrained by the interests of other agencies, and must be
coordinated because all the agencies will be bound by the international regulations these
documents and positions influence.
Coordination is defined as "simultaneously managing a flow of ongoing activities
and a set of interrelated decisions" (Rathnam et. ah, 1995: 1903), or as "managing
dependencies between activities" (Malone and Crowston, 1994: 90). These and other
academic definitions share the emphasis on the managing of dependencies between
activities in the furtherance of a common goal or objective (the common goal of U.S.
agencies is the furtherance of the national interest). Using Crowston's terminology,
"actors in organizations face coordination problems that arise from dependencies that
constrain how tasks can be performed," and to overcome these coordination problems,

actors perform additional activities called coordination mechanisms (Crowston, 1997).
An example of a coordination mechanism is a working group where conflicting positions
are resolved, or a method for prioritizing interests. An example of a coordination
problem would be one agency failing to account for the negative effects of a proposed
regulation on another agency, perhaps resulting in a sub-optimal U.S. position.
Rathnam et. ah, Mahajan, and Whinston (1995) describe coordination problems
as coordination gaps. They define a coordination gap in the context of customer support
as "the breakdowns in the work and information flows that take place within the team
during the enactment of the customer support interaction process, due to either the lack of
information, the presence of incorrect information, or the excess of unusable
information" (Rathnam et. ah, 1995: 1903). They describe the customer support process
as "a business task that involves diverse team members often working together across
organizational, departmental, hierarchical, and geographic boundaries" (Rathnam et. al.,
1995: 1900); this description is relevant to a diversity of applications; in this instance, the
members of different government agencies who must work together to form a unified
position. The government agencies come together to form groups with members that are
geographically dispersed, and in different organizations, and as such is similar to
Rathnam's customer support team.
The Purpose of Coordination Theory
The goal of coordination theory is simple: to define processes and improve
performance, with a focus on the efficient and effective management of dependencies
(Crowston, 1997). The theory enumerates two main premises that guide analysis and

reorganization under a coordination theory framework: the dependencies and
mechanisms for managing them are general and common across many organizational
settings; and, different mechanisms may be used to manage the same dependencies.
Therefore, in redesigning a process, coordination problems may be identified and
processes redesigned to correct these deficiencies (Crowston, 1997).
Identifying Coordination Mechanisms
Three main methods for identifying coordination mechanisms are: looking for
activities that appear to be coordinating mechanisms, looking for dependencies between
activities that require some coordination mechanism, and looking for coordination
problems that suggest missing coordination mechanisms (Osborn, 1993 in Crowston,
1997). In the first step, looking for coordination mechanisms themselves, we can
"examine the activities in the current process [and] identify those that seem to be part of
some coordination mechanism, then determine what dependencies they manage"
(Crowston, 1997: 163). Coordination mechanisms may take a variety of forms, including
meetings, organizational rules, and working groups, or review processes. A working
group, acting as a coordination mechanism, may be the forum where a resource is
allocated to one use or another.
When looking for dependencies, we "list the activities and resources involved in
the process, consider what dependencies are possible between them, and then determine
how these dependencies are being managed" (Crowston, 1997: 163). Finally, for looking
for coordination problems, we "can look for problems with the process that hint at
unmanaged coordination problems and identify the underlying dependencies" (Crowston,

1997: 163). Several categories of dependencies and coordinating mechanisms are
summarized in a table below (Crowston, 1997: 160):
Table 1: Coordination Mechanisms (Crowston, 1997)
Dependency
Task-Task dependency
Tasks share common output
Same characteristics
Overlapping
Conflicting
Tasks share common input
(shared resource)
Shareable resource
Reusable resource
Nonreusable resource
Output of task is input of other (prerequisite)
Same characteristics

Conflicting
Task-resource
Resource required by task

Resource-Resource
One resource depends on another

Coordination Mechanism to Manage Dependency

Look for duplicate tasks
Merge tasks or pick one to do
Negotiate a mutually agreeable result
Pick one task to do

No conflict
Notice Conflict
Schedule use of the resource
Pick one task to do
Order tasks
Ensure usability of output
Manage transfer of resources
-Reorder tasks to avoid conflict
-Add another task to repair conflict
Identify necessary resources
Identify available resources
Choose a particular set of resources
Assign the resource
Identify the dependency
Manage the dependency

Resources are anything used by or created by tasks. Tasks include the goals and
activities of the process. The electromagnetic spectrum fits in the above table as a
reusable resource—one individual's use of the spectrum may preclude another individual
from using the same band (due to interference), but the resource exists unchanged after
the use ceases. As the table above states, when conflict exists in the use of a resource, the
conflict must be recognized and then the resource use should be scheduled. Accordingly,
one method used to coordinate spectrum use is to schedule or allocate frequencies to one
use or another. One example of spectrum allocation is the Federal Communications

Commission's use of licenses for television and radio stations. However, there may be
factors other than the coordination mechanism type contributing to coordination
difficulty. Rathnam et. al (1995) provide four variables that can aid in assessing these
other factors.
Variables Affecting Coordination Mechanisms
Rathnam et. al (1995) define four independent variables that describe the
characteristics of the coordination (problem resolution) process. These variables aid in
analyzing the cause of a coordination gap (coordination failure), and provide a
framework identifying factors affecting coordination other than the dependencies and
type of mechanism used. The four independent variables Rathnam et al (1995) defined as
describing the characteristics of the problem resolution process are: interconnectedness,
input uncertainty, interaction distances, and role conflicts (Rathnam et. al, 1995: 1901).
The different variables are defined as follows: interconnectedness is "the nature and
extent of the one-to-many mapping between tasks and roles" (Rathnam et. al, 1995:
1903), input uncertainty is "the organization's incomplete information about what, where,
when, and how the customer input is going to be processed to produce desired outcomes"
(Larsson and Bowen 1989: qtd in Rathnam et. al, 1995:1903), interaction distances is
"for a given task, the amount of communication effort required to accomplish
coordination" (Rathnam et. al, 1995: 1903), and role conflicts are "the nature and extent
of the differences between the requirements of the tasks of the customer support team and
the nature of the incentive system" (Rathnam 1995: 1904). Role conflicts represent an
inconsistency between the job of an employee and their job performance evaluation, and
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do not seem especially applicable in this setting. Role ambiguity (Baker and O'Brien
1971; Ahmed and Young 1974; qtd. in Rogers, 1982: 66; Griffin 1999) is a good
substitute for role conflicts in this setting and represents a more general uncertainty about
what priorities to put first when faced with multiple relationships. Role ambiguity
represents the uncertainty about the different interests an actor represents. The interorganizational and inter-agency context faces many of the same problems measured by
Rathnam (1995), and therefore Rathnam's criteria are useful in the spectrum management
setting as well. Inter-agency or inter-organizational coordination faces problems
including communication (Torrens 1969; Gardner and Snipe 1970; Hooyman, 1976; qtd.
in Rogers, 1982: 65), role ambiguity (Baker and O'Brien 1971; Ahmed and Young 1974;
qtd. in Rogers, 1982: 66), interaction distance (Rogers, 1982: 66), and fragmentation of
authority (Rogers, 1982: 66).
Analytical Framework and Method
By combining the work of Crowston (1997) and Rathnam et. al. (1995), a multistep approach for analyzing coordination mechanisms emerges. Whereas Crowston
(1997) and Crowston and Osborn (1998) applied the theory within a single organization,
in this instance the theory will be applied between organizations from one perspective, or
within a single organization—the Executive branch of the Federal Government—from
another perspective. The application of the theory does not change, as the typologies do
not change just because the organizational boundaries are re-defined. However, as the
organizational boundaries are expanded, the tasks and activities will become more
complex because the higher-level tasks will be the summation of many lower-level tasks.
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The first step is to identify and analyze the coordination mechanism using one of
the following approaches, where the approach is selected based upon the situation and
information available: look for the coordinating mechanisms, look for dependencies, or
look for coordination problems (Osborn, 1993). The second step is to look for
unmanaged dependencies and other factors affecting coordination. The third step is to
consider the coordination mechanisms, dependencies, and other factors affecting
coordination, and identify options for improvement. While the factors that affect
coordination may be defined in different ways, Rathnam et. al (1995) provides four
categories: interconnectedness, input uncertainty, interaction distances, and role conflicts.
After the dependencies, mechanisms used (or in some cases absent), and other
characteristics are identified, the process can be redesigned to correct the problem.
Data collection for this type of analysis has been accomplished in several
manners, the most prominent of which include: case studies (Crowston, 1997; Crowston,
1991) and statistical sampling and surveys (Rathnam et. al, 1995; Van de Ven, 1976;
Roger and Whetten, 1982). Within the case study paradigm, three ways to collect
information are "1) interviewing individuals, 2) examining documents that describe
standard operating procedures, and 3) observing individuals" (March & Simon 1958, qtd.
in Crowston 1997, 162).
Generating Alternative Coordination Mechanisms
Behavioralist vs. Structuralist Schools
According to Howard E. McCurdy (McCurdy, 1983), the macro view of
coordination can be categorized into two main schools of thought, the structure and
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behavior schools. The structure school emphasizes the use of organization charts,
defined duties and responsibilities, systems of authority, bureaucracy, and other formal
mechanisms. The behavior school emphasizes individuals, teamwork, and individual
cooperation. For the structuralists, "Authority.. .was the source of all coordination,"
(McCurdy, 1983: 119) while for the behavioralists, "the job of the executive is not to
stand at the intersections of the organization and shout orders, but to orchestrate the flow
of traffic" (McCurdy, 1983: 127). This fundamental paradigm difference shapes the
options available for coordination, and places additional constraints on the process.
While the two approaches differ, they compliment each other when used together.
According to Lawler (1989), "with high interdependence [between activities], the
choice is between work teams and individual approaches to work design with extensive
hierarchy. In most cases, work teams are the best alternative because they are more cost
effective. Low interdependence favors maximizing individual performance..." (1989:
13). Therefore, a less bureaucratic approach may be more effective in managing
activities with higher interdependence.
Using the above definitions coordinating mechanisms may be categorized as
behavioral or structural. These different ways of coordinating have different costs and
advantages. The following chart summarizes, at a macro level, the trade-off between
programming (bureaucratic methods) and informal, personal interaction (behavioral
methods).
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Table 2: Summary of McCurdy (1983) and Lawler (1989)

Interdependence

Coordination Approach

Associated Management
Perspective

High

Behavioral - Less Bureaucratic

Low

Structure / Programming - More
Bureaucratic

Facilitate communication and
teamwork
Define rules, responsibilities, and
authority

Assessing Other Factors that Affect Coordination
In addition to analyzing the task dependencies and coordination mechanisms,
other factors can affect the ability to coordinate, such as distances between offices, and
the complexity of the issues to be coordinated. The variables provided by Rathnam et. al.
(1995) above provide a good framework for identifying and analyzing these other factors.
Specifically, Rathnam et. al. (1995) discovered several attributes that make coordination
more difficult. Increases in these attributes can be associated with increased difficulty
coordinating. These attributes are interconnectedness, input uncertainty, interaction
distances, and role conflicts or role ambiguity.
After identifying an aspect that contributes to one of these categories, the process
could be redesigned to reduce the effect. For example, if large interaction distances
(effort required to coordinate) are evident in a process, information technology could be
used to facilitate communication through an on-line database. The interaction distance
might manifest itself as repeated telephone calls required to gain access to needed
information. Furthermore, Table 2: above could be applied; if the interconnectedness is
low, the structured approach that dictates where official information must reside (the
database), is appropriate. However, if interconnectedness is high, a database plus colocation of the actors in the same office may be appropriate. It is difficult to specify at a
greater level of detail, as the corrective action will be situation-specific. Rathnam et. al.
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(1995) provide several information technology initiatives that were shown to mitigate
coordination problems in their survey of customer support teams (Rathnam et. al, 1995).
To mitigate input uncertainty, representation and reasoning about the interaction process,
interaction locking (simultaneous access to information, and propagation of work
performed on shared objects to the team), and process support (pre-defined work and
information flows) (Rathnam et. al, 1995) should be used. To mitigate interaction
distances, multi-user interfaces, interaction locking, and process support should be used
(Rathnam et. al, 1995: 1907). Rathnam et. al(1995) proposed a solution concerning
interaction distances, however did not find conclusive supporting evidence for the
efficacy of the solution (Rathnam et. al, 1995: 1916).
Legislation
Federal Law establishes broad coordination requirements upon certain
government agencies involved with the Global Positioning System. This body of federal
law requires that the executive branch, usually by imposing a duty upon a department's
secretary, include certain considerations when planning, designing, and operating the
system. The primary law affecting the Global Positioning System is Title 10, Section
2281 of the United States Code. Various other acts, mainly appropriations and
authorizations acts, place additional obligations on the program.
Title 10, section 2281 imposes several requirements to encourage interagency
coordination. The congressionally mandated Federal Radionavigation Plan recognizes
the need to coordinate across agencies. Congress requires this plan to be "prepared
jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation" (10 USC 2281).

15

Further coordination is required with the Department of Transportation on any
augmentations that achieve or enhance GPS transportation uses. The Secretary of
Defense must also coordinate with "the Secretary of Commerce.. .and other appropriate
trade officials to facilitate the development of new and expanded civil and commercial
uses for the GPS" (10 USC 2281). These broad guidelines show several of the
interdependencies between agencies regarding the Global Positioning System.
The Federal Radionavigation Plan "serves as the planning and policy document
for all present and future Federally provided common-use Radionavigation systems"
(Department of Defense and Department of Transportation, 2000: 1-1). Several
Memorandums of Agreement (Mo As) between the Departments of Defense and
Transportation, and the Interagency GPS Executive board (IGEB) influence the
production of the Radionavigation plan. The IGEB is a formalized high-level policy and
planning organization that encompasses numerous governmental agencies. The
memorandums recognize, on behalf of the two departments, the need to coordinate
navigation planning and utilize common systems wherever possible (Department of
Defense and Department of Transportation, 2000: 1-1). A Presidential Decision
Directive created the Interagency GPS Executive board. It is the permanent interagency
forum designed to manage GPS and U.S. Government augmentation to GPS.
Specific to spectrum management, public law 105-303 (Oct 28, 1998) states that
the president should "provide clear direction and adequate resources" so the Department
of Commerce can "achieve and sustain efficient management of the electromagnetic
spectrum used by the Global Positioning System; and protect that spectrum from
disruption and interference" on an international basis. This law also directs other broad
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coordination between the DoD designers, planners, and operators with the Department of
Commerce.
An executive order, Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6, established the
Interagency GPS Executive Board (Department of Defense and Department of
Transportation, 1997). The departments of Agriculture, Transportation, Defense,
Commerce, Interior, Justice, NASA, and State participate through the IGEB in
management and use of the system.
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III.

Methodology

Overview
This research used a case study method structured by coordination theory to guide
the analysis and data collection. The subject of the study was spectrum management with
a focus on the Global Positioning System and World Radio Conference resolutions 605 &
606. The primary sources of data were interviews with members of the Global
Positioning System Joint Program Office (JPO) located in El Segundo California, Federal
civil agencies located in the Washington D.C. area, and corroborating documentation,
when available. Finally, the analysis of the data was conducted using the theory
framework described in this chapter and chapter two.
Case Study Methodology
The methodology was a single-case study design analyzing the spectrum
management process. The spectrum management process involves many agencies and
organizations throughout the U.S. government. This process provides an opportunity to
assess a specific example of interagency coordination. Furthermore, this assessment
would help improve the interagency processes involved in Global Positioning System
spectrum management.
Case studies can be used to accomplish various goals: "to provide description
(Kidder, 1982), test theory (Pinfield, 1986; Anderson 1983), or generate theory (e.g.,
Gersick 1988; Harris & Sutton, 1986)" (qtd. in Eisenhardt, 1989: 535). This case study
falls in two categories, to provide description and to generate theory. In the first instance,

this case study will provide a description of the interagency spectrum management
process, as it applies to the Global Positioning System. Secondly, this case will use
coordination theory to assess how well the process is functioning. Additionally, the
method used to assess the process offers a roadmap for the examination and improvement
of other interagency processes.
Limiting the Scope of the Research
When examining the Global Positioning System Program, many interagency
processes could be examined. This study was limited to one interagency process—the
GPS spectrum management actions related to the 2000 World Radio Conference (WRC)
resolutions 605 & 606. This agency-spanning process was identified and chosen based
upon three criteria: importance, dysfunction, and feasibility (Hammer, 2001: 127). The
criteria serve two purposes: to ensure that the process will illustrate the difficulties
inherent in interagency coordination, and to select a process that would benefit
significantly through the application of coordination theory. The GPS spectrum
management actions related to resolutions 605 & 606 were chosen because of their high
importance, the high feasibility of examining them, and the apparent dysfunction of the
process. Furthermore, it is not the purpose of this study to assess the correctness of any
agency's decision in a particular instance. Instead, the study intends to identify problems
and suggest ways to make the coordinating process work more efficiently based on a
theoretical analysis.
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Data Collection
The data was collected through eleven interviews and supporting documentation.
The interviews were conducted over several months, through multiple site visits to the
various organizations, telephone calls and electronic mail. Generally, the individuals
interviewed were personally involved in the process. The documents were collected to
support the interviews. When an item of interest was identified in an interview,
documentation was sought both to confirm what was stated in the interview and to
provide additional information.
All data sources have the potential for error. Interview data faces several
problems including bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation (Yin, 1984).
When pertaining to established facts, confirming documents mitigate this source of error
(e-mails, memorandums, official documents). When confirming documents are not
available, multiple interview sources are used (Yin, 1984). Documentary sources may
face similar problems concerning inaccuracy or bias (Yin, 1984). This source of error is
mitigated when the document is corroborated, states an official position, is published by
an official body, or is subject to a review process. However, combining these sources
gives greater credibility. As Eisenhardt (1989) states, "[t]he triangulation made possible
by multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and
hypotheses" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538).
Data collection was accomplished in two steps. In the first step, the objective was
to identify interagency processes. To accomplish this, many individuals were
interviewed to solicit general information about the interagency processes. The
appendices contain the interview guide that was used during the unstructured interviews.
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The first stage interviews were only used to identify processes that could be investigated,
and not for analysis (appendix B). Once this preliminary information was collected, one
process was selected using the criteria of importance, feasibility, and dysfunction (as
described above). After this first round of interviews, the spectrum management process
was identified and chosen for analysis. Appendix C lists some of the other identified
processes, some of which may be suitable for future research. The second stage of data
collection focused on spectrum management. In-depth information particular to spectrum
management was gathered from multiple sources and perspectives, including interviews
from representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Joint Program Office
(JPO), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Air Force
Frequency Management Agency (AFFMA), Interagency GPS Executive Board (IGEB)
Secretariat, and a non-government spectrum management consultant. From this
information, the process was mapped, dependencies revealed, and problems examined.
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Data Analysis
The data was analyzed using coordination theory as described in the literature
review (Chapter II). Coordination theory provides the framework for looking at
interagency coordination. The basic steps include (adapted from and using: Crowston
1997; Crowston and Osborn 1998; Crowston 1991; Malone and Crowston, 1994;
Rathnamer. al, 1995):
1) Identify the Coordination Mechanisms
Identify the dependencies
Verify the model of dependencies and/or coordination mechanisms
2) Look for unmanaged dependencies and identify other factors affecting
coordination
3) Identify problems and options for improvement
Identify the Coordination Mechanisms
In the spectrum management process, the coordination mechanisms are easily
identified, and as a result, the process is well suited to an analysis that focuses on the
coordination activities, such as working groups, study groups, and approval processes
(Crowston and Osborn, 1998: 23, Crowston, 1997: 163). This type of analysis is called
an activity-focused analysis (Crowston and Osborn, 1998: 23, Crowston, 1997: 163). In
this type of analysis, the focus is to "identify coordination mechanisms, then search for
dependencies.. .identify activities in the process that appear to be coordination activities,
then ask what dependencies those activities manage" (Crowston and Osborn, 1998:23).
In the case of GPS Spectrum Management, the analysis would begin with the
coordination mechanisms, which are the various committees, and proceed to see what
dependencies those activities manage.
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It is critical that the model of mechanisms and dependencies be correct. To assess
the validity of the model, experts in the field will review the model and multiple sources
of information will be used (Yin, 1984: 36).
Lookfor unmanaged dependencies and identify other factors affecting
coordination
An unmanaged dependency is one where a dependent relationship exists, yet there
is no mechanism to coordinate it (Crowston, 1997: 168). Unmanaged dependencies can
be identified by looking for coordination problems (Crowston, 1997: 168). An example
of such a problem would be the lack of a process to manage the constituents' needs (such
as a review board), or a mechanism that does not match the type of dependency to be
managed (the review board does not have adequate authority).
Identifying other factors affecting coordination involves looking at outside factors
such as the distance between the parties or complexity of the task. It may be useful to
assess these other factors using Rathnam's (1995) variables. This may be useful because
the fundamental conditions of interagency coordination (see Rogers, 1982) are similar to
those in Rathnam's study (see Rathnam et. ah, 1995).
Identify Problems and Options for Improvement
The first two steps used to analyze data should reveal problems within
interagency coordination and areas for improvement. The exact nature of the
improvement initiatives should suit the particular situation and problem. Care should be
taken to ensure that all dependencies are addressed, and that any intervening factors (such
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as distance) are addressed. For example, if the intervening factor is distance, then the
solution should address the need to be located closer together.
Validity Threats
Four main types of validity threats affect the credibility of this study. These
include threats to construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability
(Dooley, 2001). While validity threats are difficult to assess in qualitative research
(Dooley, 2001), several techniques do exist to address these concerns. The table below
summarizes the validity threats (Yin, 1984) and the method used to mitigate the validity
threat.
Table 3: Validity Threats

Validity Threat

Applicability

Mitigation Technique

Construct Validity

Correct identification of coordination mechanisms
and dependencies.

Internal Validity

Correct analysis of coordination modes and
problems.

External Validity

Generalizability of findings to other GPS program
interagency processes.

Use multiple sources of
data to confirm or
disaffirm;
Establish a chain of
evidence;
Have key informants
review draft report
Application of coordination
theory framework
(explanation-building)
Identify common traits
between processes (out of
scope);
Use Replication (out of
scope)
Identify elements common
to interagency programs
(out of scope)
Document method and
processes;
Use protocol
Document analysis
framework and criteria,
assumptions

Ability to generalize to other interagency
programs.
Reliability

Data collection methods

Analysis

24

Construct Validity
Construct validity is defined as the extent to which the measure reflects the
intended construct (Dooley, 2001: 342) or establishing correct operational measures for
the concepts being studied (Yin, 1984: 36). Several techniques were used including
multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of evidence, and having key informants
review the findings to ensure the correct assessment of dependencies, actors, and
processes.
Internal Validity
Internal validity is defined as "truthfulness of the assertion that the observed
effect is due to the independent variables in the study" (Dooley, 2001: 346), or
"establishing a causal relationship...as distinguished from spurious relationship" (Yin,
1984: 36). Coordination theory, as defined and described in chapter 2, helps ensure
internal validity. The conclusions rest upon the careful application of the logic developed
by the experts in the fields. In turn, confidence in the logic developed by the experts
combined with the correct application, lends credibility to the results.
External Validity
External validity is defined as "generalizability of the study's findings to other
populations, places, or times" (Dooley, 2001: 345) or "establishing the domain to which a
study's findings can be generalized" (Yin, 1984: 36). The best way to assess external
validity is by "repeating the study with different subjects, in different situations and
places, and at later times," (Dooley, 2001: 272) which is outside the scope of this study.
Another method to assess external validity is through analytical generalization, which
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focuses on the similarities between situations, and how well the theory applies to other
situations (Yin, 1984: 39). This study has several tenets similar to other interagency
circumstances, which will be addressed in chapter five.
Reliability
Reliability concerns ensuring that the operations of the study can be repeated with
the same results (Yin, 1984: 36). The documented process and references should aid in
replication of this study by allowing future researchers to validate and use the same
model. Furthermore, the study should be repeatable by other researchers using the same
analytical framework and theory.
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IV.

Data Collection And Analysis

Introduction
As stated in the methodology (Chapter III), coordination problems may reveal
unmanaged dependencies (Crowston, 1997: 168). This approach, where the analysis
begins at the "problem" proves very useful in this instance. The individuals working
issues related to WRC resolutions 605 and 606 in the interagency process have
experienced great difficulty coordinating technical contributions, and to a lesser degree
proposals / views, with other agencies (Interview with FAA Spectrum Manager;
Interview with JPO Spectrum Manager; Interview with Spectrum Consultant).
Unfortunately, simply knowing that difficulty exists does not illustrate where the
root problem or cause of the difficulty is—it merely indicates that something may be
wrong. These difficulties in the interagency process provide an excellent starting point
from which to begin the analysis. Crowston states we "can look for problems with the
process that hint at unmanaged coordination problems and identify the underlying
dependencies" (Crowston, 1997: 163). Following this approach, the analysis first looks
at the point in the process where the difficulties illustrate a potential problem.
Subsequently, coordination theory guides the analysis through the process searching for
the cause of the difficulty.
To begin the analysis, it is first important to understand the context and the
interagency structure within which these issues are coordinated. A detailed explanation
of the World Radio Conference preparatory process is provided below, focusing on those
areas pertinent to the problem introduced above. Following the explanation of the
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process, the coordination analysis proceeds in an attempt to ascertain the cause of the
difficulty and identify ways to improve the process. Furthermore, as stated in chapter III,
this study looks for ways to improve the process and not assess the decisions of any
particular agency or individual.
The U.S. Domestic World Radio Conference Preparatory Process
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs)
A

rff

Dept of State

Civil Sector Spectrum
FCC
Chair: Presidential
Appointee

I

Commercial Firms

Federal Spectrum

Coordination

NTIA
Chair: Asst Sec of
Commerce

=>
Liaison

IRAC

|Federal Dept / Agencies |
FCC: Federal Communications Commission
NTIA: National Telecommunications and Information Administration
IRAC: Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (20 Agencies)

Figure 1: Domestic Spectrum Management Process (adapted from U.S. Gov. Slide)

As shown above, the electromagnetic spectrum is managed in two separate
structures: The National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA)
manages the spectrum for Federal agencies, and the Federal Communications
Commission manages the spectrum for all other users (NTIA Spectrum Manual, 2001).
The Department of State acts as the U.S. representative to international spectrum
regulatory bodies and treaty organizations, such as the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU). On matters that require international participation, the process participants
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advise the State Department under a structure called the International Telecommunication
Advisory Committee (ITAC) and U.S. delegations. Through this structure U.S. positions
are created and supporting technical work, studies, and proposals are approved and
submitted internationally.
For government users, the spectrum management process usually begins in
individual government agencies or their departments. Spectrum management actions
may be necessary in response to spectrum management developments or new program
needs. Issues may be international, domestic, or both, involving policy and technical
questions. The domestic issues are primarily handled by the NTIA, FCC, or both,
depending on the nature of the issue. International issues are handled through ITAC.
The International Telecommunications Advisory Committee Process
U.S. preparations for the World Radio Conferences consist of two different types
of products (Interview with NTIA Spectrum Manager, Spectrum Management
Consultant). The first type of product is a policy document, which is called either a
preliminary view, draft proposal, or proposal, depending on which stage in the process
the document is drafted. The preliminary view is an early position while a proposal is a
more mature position on any given issue. The second type of document is a technical
document. These technical documents, also called contributions, are submitted to ITU
working parties and other international bodies. These submissions should provide the
specific scientific, technical, and regulatory support for the existing positions or view,
and are submitted to preparatory meetings at regular intervals in the time between
conferences. Hence, one of the goals of this work process is to form the technical basis
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internationally for the U.S. position on a given issue. The figure below shows the process
for creating U.S. proposals / views and the supporting technical work.
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As indicated in figure one, the Department of State handles the U.S. participation
in international telecommunications treaty organizations, such as the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). The International Telecommunication Advisory
Committee process (ITAC) advises the Department of State in this role, and includes all
of the committees, subcommittees, and groups in figure 2 whose output feeds into the
Department of State (the FCC and NTIA are not themselves committees, but agencies
that host committees). "ITAC aids in the preparation of U.S. positions for meetings of
international treaty organizations, develops and coordinates proposed contributions to
international meetings and submits them to the Department of State for consideration"
(ITAC, 2001). Members of ITAC include "representatives of government and operating
agencies, as well as scientific or industrial organizations involved in the
telecommunications sector" (ITAC, 2001). The ITAC process is divided into several
areas, including radiocommunication (ITAC-R), telecommunications (ITAC-T), and
telecommunication development (ITAC-D). GPS spectrum issues fall under the
radiocommunication sector, or ITAC-R (ITAC, 2001).
For ITAC-R, U.S. positions are formed in the committees as indicated in figure 2.
Policy submissions enter the process on the left, into their respective federal (NTIA) or
civil (FCC) process. The FCC and NTIA proposals are merged to form official U.S.
proposals (Interview with NTIA Spectrum Manager). Contributions (technical papers)
proceed through the working parties on the right side of figure 2. The ITAC-R technical
approval process is sub-divided into study groups and working parties according to areas
of responsibility. Within the ITAC-R technical approval process, Study Group 8 has
responsibility for mobile, radiodetermination (radar), and related satellite services. The
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study groups are groupings of the working parties and do not play an independent role.
U.S. Working Party 8D is a sub-unit of Study Group 8, and has responsibility for the
Radionavigation Satellite Service (RNSS). U.S. Working Party 8B, also a sub-unit of
SG8, has responsibility for radiolocation and radiodetermination issues. The Global
Positioning System is a Radionavigation Satellite Service (RNSS). Accordingly, most
GPS World Radio Conference issues are worked through U.S. Study Group 8, U.S.
Working Party 8D (Radionavigation Satellite Service), and to a lesser degree U.S.
Working Party 8B (Radiolocation). Any interested party may join the U.S. Working
Parties (Interview with JPO Spectrum Engineer).
The ITAC-R National Committee is the approval body for all technical
contributions submitted internationally to the ITU, regional spectrum bodies, and
preparatory meetings held by the ITU. The Department of State chairs the IT AC
National Committee in consultation with the Vice Chairs, NTIA & FCC. The committee
chair, in consultation with the vice-chairs, has final approval authority. Although the
National Committee considers both unapproved and approved items, the committee will
generally only approve items approved by the Working Parties. The Working Parties
approve items on a consensus basis of interested government and industry participants
(Interview with GPS Spectrum Engineer; Interview With FAA Spectrum Engineer, 2001;
International Telecommunications Advisory Committee).
In the case of GPS, most technical actions and resulting contributions originate in
the Joint Program Office (Interview with JPO Spectrum Manager, Interview with FAA
Spectrum Manager, Interview with NTIA Spectrum Manager). These actions include
studies, analyses, simulations, tests, and proposed regulatory mechanisms. These actions

33

are documented, and the documentation must be approved through the technical approval
process of the U.S. International Telecommunication Advisory Committee (for
Radiocommunications) Process (ITAC-R) before being submitted internationally to the
ITU.
Selected Process Participants
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is a specialized agency
affiliated with the United Nations (ITU History Online), of which the United States is a
member. The Union exists to promote telecommunications standards and resolve
telecommunications issues worldwide. The ITU holds World Radiocommunication
Conferences (WRCs), which are treaty conferences that require formal proposals and
delegations under the U.S. Department of State. These conferences are "the means by
which the world distributes the resources of the radio-frequency spectrum" (U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991: 9). The final acts of WRCs have
international treaty status, and as such are generally adhered to by all 190 ITU member
countries (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991: 9-10). The ITU also
holds numerous preparatory meetings where WRC participants discuss issues and
formulate positions (Interview with JPO Spectrum Engineer). These meetings occur at
regular intervals leading up to the WRCs (JPO Briefing, Interview with JPO Spectrum
Engineer). Technical papers and proposals are presented and discussed at these meetings,
laying the foundation for eventual WRC negotiations (Interview with JPO Spectrum
Engineer).
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The United States must be able to forcefully advocate and support its positions on
radio-frequency spectrum in the international arena. "The lack of a unified radiocommunication policy, including international spectrum goals, will hurt the United
States' ability to negotiate and compete globally" (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, 1991: 3). The technical contributions that support the policy (and are a type
of narrow policy statement in themselves) require the same unity and cohesiveness to
achieve maximum effectiveness. The ITU holds the meetings that are the main
international forum where global spectrum policy and regulations standards are
established.
National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA)
The National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) is "an
agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), [and] is the Executive Branch's
principal voice on domestic and international telecommunications and information
technology issues" (NTIA, 2001). The NTIA has ultimate authority in managing the
spectrum for Federal users (Roosa, 1994). Within the NTIA, The Office of Spectrum
Management (OSM) is responsible for managing the Federal Government's use of the
radio frequency spectrum (NTIA, 2001).
The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), which the NTIA chairs,
assists "the Assistant Secretary [of Commerce] in assigning frequencies to U.S.
Government radio stations and in developing and executing policies, programs,
procedures, and technical criteria pertaining to the allocation, management, and use of the
spectrum" (NTIA Web, 2001).
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IRAC's Radio Conference Subcommittee (RCS) prepares for ITU radio
conferences, including the development of recommended U.S. Proposals and Positions
for the WRC. The RCS positions are merged with Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) WRC Advisory Committee (WAC) positions to form a united US position on a
given agenda item. Both RCS and WAC are in coordination on a regular basis
throughout the process so the proposals & positions that are developed are usually mostly
in accord with each other (Interview with JPO Spectrum Engineer 2001; Interview with
Expert Spectrum Consultant 2002; Interview with NTIA Spectrum Manager 2002).
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent U.S.
Government Regulatory Agency established by Congress in the Communications Act of
1934 (FCC Web, 2001). The FCC regulates "domestic and interstate and international
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable" (FCC Web, 2001). "The
FCC's jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. possessions"
(FCC Web, 2001). The FCC represents non-government users in the spectrum
management process. The World Radio Conference Advisory Committee (WAC)
advises the FCC on preparations for the World Radio Conference (FCC WAC WEB
Documents, 2002). Interim Working Groups (IWGs) deal with specific issues as
delegated by the WAC (FCC WAC Web Documents, 2002). Private sector participants
can offer draft proposals through the industry working groups (Interview with spectrum
consultant).
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Interagency Global Positioning System Executive Board (IGEB)
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) NTSC-6 established the Interagency GPS
Executive Board (IGEB) as a permanent body to manage GPS policy and U.S.
Government augmentations to GPS. Of particular importance, the IGEB Charter states
that part of the Board's function is to "approve management issues that affect dual-use"
and "resolve interdepartmental issues" for the benefit of GPS (Department of Defense
and Department of Transportation IGEB Charter; JPO Spectrum Manager). An interagency working group on spectrum issues, IGEB-WG 3, has been established under the
IGEB body. IGEB Working Group 3 is "focused on the protection of spectrum used by
the Global Positioning System (GPS) and its augmentations" (Department of Defense and
Department of Transportation IGEB-WG 3 Charter). Members of the IGEB and of
IGEB-WG 3 include DoD, DoC, DoT, NASA and other agencies (Department of
Defense and Department of Transportation IGEB Charter; Department of Defense and
Department of Transportation IGEB-WG 3 Charter). The IGEB and IGEB-WG 3 exist to
rectify multi-agency GPS issues, however the body does not have any official authority
and has not been influential in the national spectrum management process.
Air Force Frequency Management Agency (AFFMA)
The Air Force Frequency Management Agency (AFFMA) is an agency of the Air
Force responsible for supporting Air Force frequency management needs. The Agency
supports a wide range of programs, including space, ground, and airborne systems. The
Agency is located in the Washington, D.C. area, and is in close contact with other
frequency management organizations (Interview with AFFMA Manager, Jan 11 2002).
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Within the FAA, the Office of Spectrum Policy and Management, known as ASR,
represents the United States in ITU meetings and in the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) (FAA Web, 2001). ASR also provides the U.S. member to assist
the ICAO in formulating ICAO positions on various frequency management issues. ASR
is active in the World Radio Conference preparation process (FAA Web, 2001).
The Spectrum Planning and International Division of ASR (ASR-200) focuses on
providing for and protecting the radio frequency spectrum required to support civil
aviation communications, navigation, and surveillance services. This division has
responsibility for technical and engineering issues regarding civil aviation functions. In
accomplishing its responsibilities, ASR-200 is involved in extensive studies and technical
preparation (FAA Web, 2001).
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an agency of the United
Nations, was created by international agreement in 1947 (International Civil Aviation
Organization, 2001). ICAO's responsibilities include "maintaining co-ordination with
the International Telecommunication Union [ITU] on all matters concerning the
electromagnetic spectrum allocated to the aeronautical communications, radio navigation
and surveillance services and administering the use of these allocations" (International
Civil Aviation Organization, 2001). ICAO's recommendations have considerable
influence on ITU member countries and the aviation community. As a result, ICAO
plays a role in shaping the international opinion regarding resolutions 605 and 606.
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Currently, "the ICAO position is to support a single maximum aggregate interference
limit [PFD limit] for all RNSS systems operating in [L5]" (Capretti and Witzen, 2001:
29).
Overview of Domestic Agencies' GPS Roles
The chart below outlines some of the IT AC members' GPS-related roles as
defined in the 1999 Federal Radionavigation Plan, Presidential Decision Directive, or
Public Law.
Table 4: Agency GPS Responsibilities

Party
Department of Defense

Responsibility
Global Positioning System

Department of Commerce

Global Positioning System
Spectrum and Commercial
Applications
Civil Application of Global
Positioning System

DOT/FAA

Department of State

Manage interference testing
in the GPS Spectrum to
prevent disruptions to
service.
Oversight of interagency
review process

Reference
March 29, 1996 Presidential
Decision Directive; 1999
Federal Radionavigation
Plan, A-2
Public Law 105-303

March 29, 1996 Presidential
Decision Directive; 1999
Federal Radionavigation
Plan, A-5
1999 Federal
Radionavigation Plan, 3-9

March 29, 1996 Presidential
Decision Directive; 1999
Federal Radionavigation
Plan, A-10

World Radio Conference 2003 Resolutions 605 and 606
At the 2000 World Radio Conference, European efforts resulted in the approval of
resolutions 605 and 606 (agenda item 1.15), which the United States opposed (Schoettler,
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2001: 48, 49). These resolutions stated a need to consider power flux density limits on
the L2 and L5 frequencies of the Global Positioning System (Schoettler, 2001: 48, 50), as
well as future Radionavigation Satellite Systems (RNSS). GPS satellites transmit
navigation data to the GPS receivers on the L2 and L5 bands. The limits are based upon
the theory that GPS Satellite transmissions can interfere with Radars and Distance
Measuring Equipments (DME's), which have been assignments in the L2 and L5 bands
respectively.
The United States Air Force GPS Joint Program Office (JPO) has been
conducting technical work to either substantiate or refute the theory that GPS
transmissions will interfere with incumbent systems. In the case of the L2 band, there
have not been any reports of interference to radars in the 23 years that GPS has been in
operation. The GPS L5 band will not start transmitting until 2005 and will not be fully
operational until 2016.
Such limits would directly affect the $1.2B GPS modernization and are
undesirable to the United States for several reasons. U.S. forces depend upon GPS
technology, and the successful jamming of current and weaker GPS signals would be
harmful to U.S. operations, and could place U.S. troops at risk. A high-powered or
focused GPS signal is an effective countermeasure to jamming. The PFD limits restrict
the power of GPS signals, and therefore increase the system's susceptibility to jamming.
Non-military uses of GPS are also susceptible to malicious or inadvertent interference,
which a high-powered signal would help overcome. A higher-powered civil signal will
also maximize the availability of signal at any given point on Earth, thus improving GPS
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reliability and utility. In fact, the L5 civil signal is designed to be more powerful than the
current LI civil signal.
Resolutions 605 and 606 will inhibit the Global Positioning System
modernization program. Future and unforeseen national security interests or civil
applications may require more powerful signals. Once international rules on power
restrictions become permanent, changes to these rules will require international
agreement. If the restrictions could not be lifted, the system's development would be
constrained.
There are several reasons besides the claim of interference why foreign countries
could desire to place power flux density limits upon the Global Positioning System.
First, some foreign governments could find themselves in a military confrontation with
the United States, and lower power levels would make jamming GPS signals easier.
Secondly, the European Union is developing a rival satellite navigation system called
Galileo. Placing PFD limits upon the satellite navigation frequencies limits the U.S.
system, but has no effect on the yet un-fielded European system. The limits would
inhibit the development of the U.S. system, which might help a rival European system to
gain acceptance in the future. Otherwise, with unbridled development, the American
system may so far exceed a European system by the time it is operational, that the
European system may never gain acceptance. Finally, any adversary of the United States
might support a restriction that limits the American system, when the country itself does
not have such a system and is not affected.
The veracity of these theories is not important to the conclusions of this study; it
is only important that plausible motivations other than claims of interference exist for
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limitations on radionavigation satellite transmissions. These other plausible motivations
increase the need for the United States to present a coherent and persuasive position to
the international community.
GPS Spectrum Defense Efforts
The United States Air Force GPS JPO has taken action to protect the GPS
spectrum including technical studies, analyses, simulations, tests, developing regulatory
mechanisms, and conducting outreach efforts to other countries (Department of the Air
Force WRC-03 Plan). The U.S. proposals for Resolutions 605 and 606 have been
developed and state the U.S. positions. The U.S. position for Resolution 605 is a
coordination procedure whereby the RNSS operators will coordinate to provide
protection to incumbent systems and retain the flexibility to modernize and build future
RNSS systems. The U.S. position for Resolution 606 is that no PFD limit is needed (U.S.
Preliminary View). Technical analyses are performed in conjunction with policy
formulation to ensure that correct policy has been selected, and is demonstrated as fact to
the international community. As such, the results of the technical studies and tests are
contributions to the WRC preparatory meetings and ITU, and should support the existing
U.S. position. In order to submit papers internationally, they must be coordinated and
approved through the ITAC-R Technical Approval Process.
Consensus-Based Coordination
Crowston's typology, as shown in chapter two, states that when activities share a
common output, and that output is overlapping, a mutually agreeable result should be
negotiated; when the tasks conflict, one task should be chosen to do (Crowston 1997).
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The various activities performed by the different actors in the technical approval process
share a common output; in other words, anything that is submitted internationally is
considered to be submitted by the United States Government, and not any individual
agency. All of the documents and positions come together (a shared output) in the U.S.
negotiations at the World Radio Conference. As such, the individual agencies should be
in concurrence with a document when it goes international. The domestic process is
organized to ensure that result. All agencies and even private sector participants can
provide input into the IT AC process, and voice disagreements where appropriate. In the
technical approval process, the government and industry participants work together in the
same committees and working groups. In the proposal generating process, the private
sector interfaces with the FCC and Federal government agencies interface with the NTIA.
In the IT AC process, the task dependencies are often overlapping, and a mutually
agreeable result can be negotiated. This means that including one party's concerns does
not affect or conflict with including those of any other party. An example of such an
occurrence would be if one agency requires "A" or "B", and another agency requires "B"
or "C", such that the agencies could negotiate to perform "B"—a mutually agreeable (and
efficient) result. A consensus-based process works well for this type of situation.
The second possibility for activities with a shared output is that the tasks will
conflict. This means that including one party's concerns will affect or conflict with
including those of any other party. One such example would be if one agency would
benefit from a regulation and another would be harmed by the same regulation. While
there may be some middle ground where each agency gets part of their objectives met,
any solution will involve a trade-off. A consensus-based process, by definition, does not
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have the ability to make this trade-off decision if the parties will not agree. The
consensus process is susceptible to negotiation tactics by parties acting in their own best
interest, desiring to obtain a more favorable outcome. Consequently, the outcome may be
the sub-optimal trade-off between individual agencies' interests strongly influenced by
bureaucratic power.
WRC 605 and 606 Technical Work Coordination
Unfortunately, the technical work surrounding WRC 2000 resolutions 605 and
606 is among the minority of issues where a mutually agreeable result is not easily
obtained. With conflicting interests, agencies may consistently disagree about the
methodology used in a study, the conclusions to be drawn from an analysis, and many
other aspects of technical work. Agencies would disagree because certain
methodologies, technical definitions, and conclusions would change their ability to
protect their agency's interests presently or in the future.
Such is the case with technical work surrounding WRC Resolutions 605 and
606. The table below summarizes the interests of the various parties. The main players
in the 605 and 606 issues are the Air Force and the FAA. The other parties listed also
play a role, but are not extensively involved.
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Table 5: Agency Perspectives

Agency
FAA

AF/GPS (JPO)

Position / Perspective
• Brings awareness of ICAO's perspective to IT AC
process
• Protect aviation systems
• DME's have priority over GPS as a "safety of life"
application
•
•
•

AFFMA

•
•

NTIA

•

•
•

Protect GPS system against adverse regulation, i.e.
PFD limits and "excessive" international oversight.
GPS modernization and future applications will
require more power.
Testing and analysis has not shown any need for PFD
for resolution 606 and developed coordination
mechanisms for resolution 605 to satisfy both RNSS
and ARNS systems
Must represent all Air Force spectrum interests
Need to stay on amicable relations with other D.C.
located spectrum offices in order to maintain ability
to negotiate.
NTIA does not have the resources to get involved in
interagency disputes related to WRC resolutions 605
&606.
NTIA has not played as active a role in these (WRC
605 & 606) issues as they could have.
NTIA views many issues as interagency squabbles.

Reference
FAA Web, 2001
Interview, FAA
Spectrum
Engineer,
December 4,
2001
Interview with
GPS Spectrum
Engineer: 19
December, 2001

Interview with
AFFMA
Spectrum
Manager: 11
January 2002
Interview with
NTIA Spectrum
Manager

The above table illustrates the diversity of perspectives the involved parties hold.
These divergent and fairly noncompatible views between the Air Force and the FAA
begin to show why coordination by consensus would be difficult between these parties.
Furthermore, the perspectives of the other parties contribute to coordination difficulty.
The unofficial perspective presented within NTIA explains why that agency has not taken
an active role in the coordination.
The perspective presented from AFFMA hints at a problem within the Air Force
in presenting a consistent approach on these issues based on the different views of and
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priority given to the same spectrum issue. ICAO's role further complicates the issue due
to FAA's relationship with ICAO, and ICAO's relationship with the international
aviation community.
The specific problem exists between the GPS spectrum interests and the FAA's
concerns regarding Distance Measuring Equipment (DMEs). The FAA uses DMEs (JPO
Spectrum Engineer), and as a result, the FAA has a reason to support interpretations
favorable to DMEs when coordinating issues related to WRC resolutions 605 and 606.
The JPO desires unrestrained use of RNSS spectrum for the reasons outlined above.
The Global Positioning System Joint Program Office and FAA have conflicted on
the nature of U.S. technical papers and positions submitted to the ITU regarding these
matters (JPO Spectrum Engineer; FAA Spectrum Engineer; Spectrum Consultant
Expert). The FAA has opposed the JPO authored papers within U.S. Working Party 8D.
The language in the papers has been diluted to achieve consensus, usually weakening the
asserted position (JPO Spectrum Engineer).
The difficulty in presenting papers stems from two issues coordinated in ITAC-R,
especially Working Party 8D. "[T]he FAA's goal is to approve Satnav [GPS] as the only
radionavigation system required to be installed in an aircraft to support operations
anywhere in the NAS [National Air Space]" (Department of Defense and Department of
Transportation, 2000: 3-27). However, the FAA also currently operates and will continue
to operate DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) for backup aircraft navigation
(Department of Defense and Department of Transportation, 2000: 3-27). The PFD limits
sought by the Europeans were based upon the theory that GPS signals would interfere

46

with radars / DMEs (Schoettler, 2000: 51), and the ongoing discussions center around
this interference issue.
Both the FAA and JPO have expressed the continual difficulty and aggravation
surrounding these issues. Some FAA employees involved in working these issues have
expressed that it has been very difficult to reach agreement. They have expressed that the
issues have been confrontational between the agencies (FAA Spectrum Manager), that
there is no arbiter of the preparatory process, that it is get consensus or do not go, and that
no one is looking out for what is best for the U.S. as a whole (FAA Spectrum Manager).
Employees at the JPO have expressed similar views or concurred with these opinions
(JPO Spectrum Manager).
These divergent interests between the FAA and JPO surrounding WRC
resolutions 605 and 606 make consensus-based coordination problematic. The FAA has
pursued a strategy in line with their interests, which is to advocate measures that would
benefit their DME's systems (FAA Spectrum Manager). However, this strategy is in
direct conflict with the GPS JPO interests. The NTIA has not provided overall guidance
or leadership in resolving these issues, but instead has played a facilitator role
encouraging the parties to achieve consensus (NTIA Spectrum Manager; FAA Spectrum
Manager; JPO Spectrum Manager). The ITAC-R national committee could provide the
leadership necessary to resolve conflicts. However, they generally act only as facilitators
(AFFMA Technical Manager; JPO Spectrum Manager).
As a result, the current approach is to fight out the issue bureaucratically or give
in to compromise when the other party is successful in blocking your action (NTIA
Spectrum Manager; FAA Spectrum Manager; JPO Spectrum Manager). Agency
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representatives have raised issues to higher levels within their department when
consensus cannot be reached.
This situation has a striking similarity to observations made in a 1991
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment report. This report stated that with no
clear leadership, the process "depends on the power of individual personalities and the
personalities among major players" (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
1991: 101). The goal of the process is to reflect the best interests of the U.S. government,
not to be unduly influenced by the power of individual players. As a result of this
system, some submissions and alterations to technical contributions are more influenced
by agency interests than focused upon supporting the existing U.S. position.
Subsequently, the technical submissions may not support the existing position as strongly
as they could.
Other Factors Affecting Coordination
Several other factors make coordinating these issues exceptionally difficult.
These factors include interaction distances, interconnectedness, and role ambiguity.
Interaction distances refers to the effort required to coordinate (Rathnam et. ah, 1995;
Torrens 1969; Gardner and Snipe 1970; Hooyman, 1976; qtd. in Rogers, 1982),
interconnectedness refers to the degree of interrelationships between the tasks (Rathnam
et. ah, 1995), and role ambiguity refers to the degree to which individuals represent
multiple interests (Baker and O'Brien 1971; Ahmed and Young 1974; qtd. in Rogers,
1982: 66; Rathnam 1995: 1904-1905).
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The interaction distances are high due to the geographic separation of the FAA
and JPO, as well as other agencies. The FAA spectrum office is located in Washington,
D.C., and the GPS Joint Program Office is located in Los Angeles, CA, three time zones
apart. Face-to-face meetings and discussions require a lengthy flight across the country.
Conference calls and teleconferences face the difficulty of a three-hour time difference.
The program office can attend many meetings in Washington D.C., but finds it extremely
difficult to maintain an active presence. The other co-located Washington, D.C. agencies
should find it easier to meet and reach agreements that do not include the JPO's
considerations. The JPO and GPS interests should, however, have a presence in D.C.
through the Air Force Frequency Management Agency.
Role ambiguity plays a minor role in the process; however, several instances of
role ambiguity are pertinent. First, the FAA works closely with ICAO on an
interpersonal level and is thereby influenced by ICAO to an uncertain degree (Spectrum
Consultant Expert; NTIA Spectrum Manager). Thereby, ICAO may influence the FAA,
bringing non-U.S. interests into the process. Secondly, AFFMA, as the JPO's
representative in the D.C. area, has to represent numerous Air Force issues in addition to
GPS, and is co-located with the other agencies. Subsequently, when negotiating one of
many issues with the other agencies, AFFMA has to balance the interests of different
systems (AFFMA Technical Director), may trade off one system's priority in
negotiations for another, and as a result may not give the JPO as much support or priority
as the JPO desires.
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The high levels of interconnectedness are caused by the nature of the technical
work being performed. The technical work often requires extensive coordination
between the FAA and JPO.
The primary difficulty in coordinating these issues stems from the use of an
improper coordination mechanism—a consensus-based process. The use of a consensusbased process to coordinate directly conflicting issues by coequal process players results
in interagency power struggles and solutions that may not reflect the national interests (as
defined by the existing U.S. view or proposal). Coordination is complicated to a lesser
degree by interaction distances, interconnectedness, and role ambiguity. Among these
three (interaction distances, interconnectedness, and role ambiguity) interaction distances
seems to have the largest impact due to the three-hour time difference and large
geographic separation of the JPO and FAA.
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V.

Conclusions And Recommendations

As described previously, the ITAC process acts to integrate the many interests of
U.S. agencies and private sector participants. Within this process, proposals or views and
supporting technical documents are approved for international use. In many occasions,
coordinating the interests of different parties or agencies simply means incorporating the
various interests into the document. However, with certain issues, incorporating one
agency's interests must come at the expense of another agency's interests. For these
issues, a consensus-based process becomes a power struggle. Accordingly, an
examination of resolution 605 and 606 issues in the ITAC process revealed several
propositions regarding consensus-based coordination processes:
Theoretical Conclusions
The application of coordination theory to the interagency coordination process
revealed several propositions:
1. A consensus-based coordination process is adequate for: activities that share a
common output, and that output is overlapping. A consensus-based process is
suited to issues that do not directly conflict, and where a mutually agreeable
result is negotiable.
2. A consensus-based coordination process is not adequate for: activities that
share a common output, and the tasks conflict. In this instance, a mutually
agreeable result is not easily obtained.
a. When conflicting tasks are coordinated through a consensus-based
interagency process, agency power struggles will ensue.

51

i. The result of such a power struggle will be in line with the
agency having the most authority, influence, or resources,
b. When tasks conflict, there needs to be a mechanism separate from the
two coequal parties, such as an independent decision-maker, to decide
what takes priority.
Specific Conclusions concerning GPS spectrum / regulatory issues
In addition to the theoretical aspects, this study sought to identify the situationspecific problem or problems in coordinating ITU contributions (especially technical
papers) relevant to WRC resolutions 605 and 606 within the U.S. government.
Defending and advancing U.S. interests at the ITU requires submitting the results of
technical efforts in the form of technical contributions. The problem is that changes to
technical contributions are allowed that are strongly influenced by interagency power
struggles and thereby not necessarily consistent with or supporting of the existing U.S.
position. Changes that are influenced by agency interests instead of supporting the
existing U.S. position weaken the United States' ability to support its spectrum positions
internationally. Increased involvement of leadership in approval process of technical
contributions may mitigate this problem.
The logic behind these specific findings is outlined below. First the premises or
base assumptions are listed. The premises are followed by important findings of fact.
The conclusions are determined from an analysis of the facts using coordination theory
and the premise as the desired state or goal.
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This study assumes the following premise:
1. Any technical contribution submitted internationally to the ITU should support
the existing U.S. position.
a. The term "U.S. position," as used above is defined to mean the existing
U.S. view / proposal on the given issue.
b. The term "technical contribution submitted internationally" refers to those
technical contributions created within the U.S., and approved by the IT AC
National Committee.
This study makes the following findings of fact:
1. Changes to technical contributions are being made that are inconsistent with the
existing U.S. view / proposal or simply weaken the argument.
a. One or more agencies are making these changes that are seen as favorable
to their agency's interests; examples of these changes are a more favorable
interference methodology or wording of a paper's findings.
This study makes the following conclusions:
1. There is insufficient oversight and enforcement to ensure any changes to technical
submissions are consistent with the existing U.S. view / proposal or unnecessarily
weaken the argument.
2. Although an agency may disagree with the existing view or proposal for its own
reasons, they must act as if in agreement with that policy in the technical approval
process.
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3. The geographical separation between the GPS JPO and Washington D.C.-based
Federal Agencies increases the effort required to coordinate.
Suggested remedial actions:
Below are suggested actions, along with their potential advantages and
disadvantages. The suggested actions may be combined or used individually.
Action: Have the NTIA assume a more aggressive leadership role to ensure all
internationally submitted technical work and changes thereto are in strict compliance
with the existing U.S. view or proposal.
Advantages: The NTIA is already the principal Federal Government spectrum
manager. Under a more proactive leadership role, the NTIA could influence the Federal
Agencies, set overall spectrum goals, and ensure a cohesive effort.
Disadvantages: The NTIA may need increases in budget and work force to
assume a greater level of detail in the process.
Action: Use the existing U.S. view or proposal on a given issue as a benchmark
by which to settle disagreements between agencies and parties on input documents.
Advantages: No structural changes to the process are required. Process
participants will no longer feel compelled to compromise on issues and lengthy
controversies and arguments could be avoided.
Disadvantages: This approach gives additional weight to the existing U.S. view
or proposal, and could cause difficulties in changing it if evidence becomes available to
necessitate that.
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Action: Create a GPS-JPO field office in the Washington D.C. area directly
under the control of the Joint Program Office.
Advantages: The JPO will have a greater attendance at the frequent spectrumrelated meetings that occur in the D.C. area, and the JPO representatives can develop
personal relationships with other agencies' D.C. based employees. The personal
relationships will facilitate teamwork and communication, and the geographical location
of the individuals will reduce the effort required to attend meetings.
Disadvantages: The most obvious drawback is the additional expense.
Additionally, unless actions are taken to reinforce the connection of the D.C. based office
with that in Los Angeles, the goals and vision of the geographically separated offices
may drift apart.
Limitations of Findings
This research focused on the technical contributions created and submitted in
response to WRC 2000 resolutions 605 and 606. While the conclusions of this study
should be applicable to this specific example, there may be other factors that prevent the
conclusions from being generalized to the process as a whole. Additionally, while the
views of many different agencies and experts were incorporated in the study, other
pertinent perspectives may not have been considered.
Future Research Topics
1. The IGEB charter states that, among other responsibilities, it exists to "approve
management issues that affect dual-use" and "resolve interdepartmental issues"
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(Department of Defense and Department of Transportation IGEB Charter; JPO Spectrum
Manager). Assess the IGEB's ability to perform these functions.
2. Assess the individual government agencies' buy-in to the IGEB, their
willingness to resolve disputes there, and willingness to accept the decisions.
3. The Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements exists to generate civil
requirements for the Global Positioning System. Coordination is required to integrate the
civil and military, obtain funding, and make trade-off decisions. Ineffective coordination
can result in unmet or unstated requirements. Preliminary indications show insufficient
performance accountability between the IFOR and civil requirement process. Assess the
effectiveness of the IFOR process.
4. Identify the factors that make coordinating a multi-agency program difficult.
Suggested case studies include NPOESS (National Polar Orbiting Environmental
Satellite System), the Global Positioning System, and the newly created Homeland
Security Office.
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Appendix A: Acronyms

AFFMA
ARNS
CITEL
CPM
DME
DoD
FAA
FCC
GPS
ICAO
IGEB
IGEB-WG3
IT AC
IRAC
ITU
IWG
JPO
NAS
NASA
NTIA
OTA
PFD
PV
RCS
RNSS
SG
WAC
WP
WP8B
WP8D
WRC
WRC 2000

Air Force Frequency Management Agency
Aeronautical Radionavigation System
Inter-American Telecommunication Commission
World Radio Conference Preparatory Meeting
Distance Measuring Equipment
Department of Defense
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Global Positioning System
International Civil Aviation Organization
Interagency GPS Executive Board
Interagency GPS Executive Board Working Group 3
International Telecommunications Advisory Committee
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
International Telecommunications Union
Interim Working Group
(The Global Positioning System's) Joint Program Office
National Air Space
National Air and Space Administration
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment
Power Flux Density
Preliminary View
Radio Conference Subcommittee
Radio Navigation Satellite Systems
Study Group
World Radio Conference Advisory Committee
U.S. Working Party
U.S. Working Party 8B
U.S. Working Party 8D
World Radio Conference
World Radio Conference held in the year 2000
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Appendix B: Interview Guide for Preliminary Interviews1:
Hello Sir/Ma'am:
I am researching interagency coordination between the DoD component of the Global Position System and
the Civil agencies. I am looking for specific examples of activities that require interagency coordination,
how these processes function, and the problems or successes inherent in these processes.
Use one of these approaches, depending on the particulars of the example given (if the example involves
coordination mechanisms, use the activity focused approach; if the mechanisms are not obvious, use the
dependency-focused approach)
Dependency-Focused analysis: Identify dependencies, then search for coordination mechanisms. In other words, look for
dependencies, then ask which activities manage those dependencies. Failure to find such activities might suggest potentially
problematic unmanaged dependencies.
In dependency-focused analysis, we examine the activities and the resources they use, determine possible dependencies by
considering which resources are used by more than one activity and then look for other activities within the process that manage
these dependencies. More specifically, to identify dependencies and mechanisms, we ask questions such as the following about
each activity in turn:
■What are the inputs to this activity (physical, informational, and other preconditions such as permissions? Are there flow
dependency with the activities that create these resources? Are these resources used by other activities, creating shared resource
dependencies?
■What are the outputs? Is there a flow dependency with the activities that use these resources? Do multiple activities
create these resources, creating common output dependencies?
'What other resources are used, e.g., actors, resources, or other items of importance in the process? Are there shared
resource dependencies with these resources? How are these resources assigned to this activity?

Activity-focused analysis: Identify coordination mechanisms, then search for dependencies. In other words, identify activities
in the process that appear to be coordination activities, then ask what dependencies those activities manage. This approach asks if the
coordination activities are necessary or effective.
Two main heuristics: 1) Search directly for coordination activities. Identify tasks and see what they coordinate. Identify
shortcomings in the coordination activity. 2) Identify individuals that coordinate. Identify what they coordinate, and how the
coordination takes place.

Possibilities for areas to examine:
Specifications that multiple agencies rely upon
Documents that multiple agencies rely upon
Requirements involving more than one agency

1

This guide was used to gather preliminary information about a process and determine if the process was a
good candidate for analysis.
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Appendix C: Preliminary Process Identification
Processes analysis working sheet:
Process "Name"

Dysfunction, Importance,
Feasibility (High,
Medium, Low)

Spectrum Management

H
H
H

Document approval and
publication,
ICDGPS705 (currently
draft)
SPS Spec and
Guaranteed
Performance levels
SV19 End of Life Test,
non-routine

M
L
M

Non-routine issue, test
of GPS satellite for
interference.

M
L
H

IFOR and DoD
Acquisition Milestone
Process

M
H
L

IGEB as a coordination
mechanism

M
H
L

M
H
L
M
L
H

Notes and Characteristics

The GPS program complies with international electromagnetic frequency allocations. As a
result, the program must represent its interests in a domestic and international setting.
The GPS spectrum management process operates through several organizations including
the U.S. Working Party Process, the IGEB, International Telecommunications Union,
CITEL, and The International Civil Aviation Organization, and others. These
organizations work to coordinate the multitude of positions within the U.S. Government,
regions, and the world.
The L5 Specification is given to a contractor, (in this case ARINC) to write the Interface
Control Document -> document then undergoes a JPO internal review -> the document is
send to the DoT for review, and an iterative process with the DoD to come to a consensus
on the document's contents.
Drafting and publishing these specifications involves a multitude of organizations (and
their sub-organizations), including the DoT, DoD, FAA, RTCA, and others. Pay attention
to mismatches in documents and performance parameters.
FAA affiliated Stanford professor working on WAAS determined need to conduct a test on
GPS satellite. Test had to be coordinated across multiple agencies, including 2nd Space
Operations Squadron (AF), JPO, and FAA/DOT. No individual owned process or had
responsibility for overall process. NOTE: Test did not take place due to unrelated reasons.
2nd Space Operations Squadron, OO-ALC-LH (Hill AFB Radar Squadron) 124 & 117, also
coordinated with the FAA; FAA did not approve, and Air Force researched legal
ramifications and indicated to FAA that it was not part of the process. FAA agrees.
Coordination was accomplished along mainly informal modes.
The Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements exists to generate civil requirements
for the Global Positioning System. Coordination is required to integrate the civil and DoD
requirements, fund, and make trade-off decisions. Ineffective coordination can result in
unmet or unstated requirements. Preliminary indications show insufficient performance
accountability between the IFOR and civil requirement process.
The IGEB operates to coordinate many interagency aspects of GPS. Investigation could
asses this effectiveness. Preliminary indications indicate problems with a consensus
decision-making format.

Note: this table is the result of only a preliminary investigation; the descriptions are not developed, and
the list is not exhaustive. This is only provided to illustrate some of the processes.
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